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RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000588

SIPDIS  
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF/C  
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OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON  
NSC FOR GAVIN  
LONDON FOR POL - LORD  
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA  
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREL](#) [EAID](#) [PREF](#) [EU](#) [FR](#) [UNSC](#) [CA](#) [CD](#)  
SUBJECT: CHAD: MINURCAT MAKING BIG PUSH ON SECURITY IN EAST

REF: A. NDJAMENA 520  
[B](#). N'DJAMENA 511  
[C](#). N'DJAMENA 521

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)1. (SBU) MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo met December 7 with representatives of UN member states resident in N'Djamena to describe the PKO's "big push" over the past month to enhance security in Eastern Chad, in the wake of recent kidnappings and a general increase in criminal activity directed against the international community (described in Refs A and B, as well as below). Initiatives undertaken since Angelo's last periodic meeting include additional MINURCAT air and ground patrols, additional DIS patrols and escorts, provision of supplemental international assets to the DIS, and inauguration of new coordination meetings among MINURCAT, the DIS, and local Chadian government authorities, police, gendarmes, nomad patrols, the Chadian military, and traditional/tribal leaders, all of whom have a stake in regaining control of security and reducing criminality in the vicinity of the Chad-Sudan border. Although criminality in the East has forced reductions in some NGO operations, and although there are clear limits to what MINURCAT can do to manage the problem -- particularly given slow international deployments (Ref C) -- we remain impressed with Angelo's honesty, proactiveness, creativity, and commitment, as well as his success at coordinating with the range of Chadian players. At the end of his meeting, Angelo briefly sketched out a list of issues on which future international reflection will be needed, including MINURCAT's mandate renewal process, to begin among the UNSC membership in February 2010. END SUMMARY.

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CRIMINAL THREAT  
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[1](#)2. (SB) Angelo reported that two kidnappings of humanitarian aid workers, five car-jackings, three instances of breaking and entry, two direct attacks on the DIS, and three problems with unexploded ordnance had occurred in Eastern Chad/Northeastern CAR (with one B&E case in N'Djamena) since November 4. The kidnappings and attacks

were having a "negatively transformative effect" on humanitarian operations, he stressed. There was no clear evidence that the individual incidents were linked, but some appeared to be copy-cat initiatives inspired by earlier activities. That all the kidnapping victims were apparently now being held across the border in Sudan led to suspicion that the kidnappers knew one another. All of the criminal acts seemed to be motivated almost exclusively by a desire for financial gain, although some of the kidnappers had expressed vague Islamist aspirations and anti-colonial sentiments. The personnel of one nation in particular (France) seemed to have been targeted, although all internationals and Chadians working for the international community were vulnerable, Angelo pointed out.

13. (SBU) Asked whether the kidnappers might have ties to radical Muslim groups in the Sahel, Angelo repeated that the copy-cat phenomenon seemed to be a more salient explanation, adding that no organizational links to groups such as AQIM had been uncovered thus far. He advised that the UN strongly opposed payment of ransom, and offered that ransom payments believed to have been made earlier in the year in the cases of other kidnapping victims might have planted ideas in the minds of the current kidnappers. Angelo described efforts to explain to the kidnappers the humanitarian motivations of the organization for which their victims worked, which the kidnappers had lauded -- making clear that they hoped the organizations would resume the important work suspended as a result of rampant criminality -- before reiterating demands for ransom. Angelo noted that Chadian government representatives and local sultans and tribal leaders had been uniform in condemning the rise in criminality near the Sudan

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border and uniform in expressing frustration at their powerlessness to bring the situation under control.

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RESPONSE FROM MINURCAT  
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14. (SBU) Deputy Force Commander Ahern reported on efforts to deploy incoming MINURCAT military assets, including units from Mongolia in the northern sector, Ghana in the dangerous central region (encompassing Farchana and Guereda), Namibia in the south, and Nepali reserve units to Abeche, along with troops from Bolivia, Bangladesh, Paraguay and Pakistan to the airport in Abeche. Ahern detailed increases in air and ground patrols, with helicopter overflights numbering 74 in November (vice 49 in October), MINURCAT escorts numbering 78 and MINURCAT patrols numbering 151 since November 4. DIS patrols in November amounted to 1283, as opposed to 943 in September and 851 in October. DIS escorts in November were 544 in number, vice 270 in September and 212 in October.

15. (SBU) General Chaumont of UNPOL, who has been the primary champion and training officer for the DIS, indicated that UNPOL had provided an additional 90 vehicles to the Chadian force in November, as well as beefing up security at DIS headquarters and providing additional armaments and equipment to the DIS. Libya had offered to provide the DIS with medevac guarantees and assistance with medical care, considering that a number of DIS officers had been injured in the course of their duties but lacked obvious sources of treatment. The DIS remained very fragile, but it was clearly on the right path, Chaumont concluded.

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ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH CHADIAN ENTITIES  
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16. (SBU) Angelo reported on a series of new coordination meetings among MINURCAT, the DIS, and local Chadian officials representing governors, mayors, the police, gendarmes, nomad patrol units, the Chadian military, sultans and tribal leaders. Coordination meetings were taking place at least

bi-monthly in Abeche, Farchana, Iriba and Goz Beida, said Angelo, and had achieved goals such as establishment of mutually-receivable radio communications and agreement to conduct mixed patrols. MINURCAT was using the meetings to discuss human rights issues with local relevance as well as security matters. The Chadian representatives had uniformly expressed dismay at their inability to exert control over banditry, as well as strong desire to work with the international community to get the situation under control.

¶17. (SBU) Angelo described MINURCAT's coordination with CONAFIT, the Chadian governmental structure designed to interact with international peacekeepers, as a work in progress, in part because CONAFIT was itself a relatively new and rather unusual entity. He stressed that after the last two dangerous months, all Chadian and international actors, including humanitarian workers themselves, seemed to have developed a better appreciation that they had personal responsibilities to carry out if the security situation were to become more manageable. Angelo noted that MINURCAT's dialogue with humanitarian workers continued and would intensify if that seemed useful.

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DOWN THE ROAD  
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¶18. (SBU) Looking ahead, Angelo advised that the UNSC would begin considering possible mandate revision or renewal for MINURCAT in February 2010. Recalling that the current mandate had provisions for a one-year renewal, Angelo made clear that he did not expect major debate, although the terms of MINURCAT's involvement in the CAR arguably needed to be either expanded, to give it more authority, or reduced, so that expectations would not continue to exceed capabilities. He also offered that coordination among MINURCAT, UNAMID,

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BONUCA and other regional UN peacekeeping and related efforts should increase, in light of the interrelationships among the problems that the separate operations were designed to address. Angelo pointed out that Chadian FM Faki was quite positive about the prospect of MINURCAT's staying in Chad for another year, but added that MINURCAT sought concurrence and support of government officials at all levels in both Chad and CAR. Angelo ended by making a plug for international contributions to the UN Trust Fund, pointing out that the DIS, the prime beneficiary of the fund, was "an infant force, in need of lots of support at this stage in its life."

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COMMENT  
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¶19. (SBU) Continued near-anarchy in certain locations along the Chad-Sudan border is forcing reductions in some humanitarian operations and crippling morale among international NGO reps. Victor Angelo is under no illusions regarding MINURCAT's ability to bring about a turn-around, although his honesty, proactiveness, creativity, and commitment, as well as success at coordinating with the range of Chadian players, are impressive and helpful. The inability of some contributing nations to deploy adequately-equipped and trained troops so that rotations can occur on schedule (see Ref C) is undercutting MINURCAT's effectiveness; septel requests demarches to Accra and Kathmandu in the aim of accelerating arrival of deployments from these contributors.

¶10. (U) Minimize considered.  
NIGRO